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In this time of strategic uncertainty as well as the return to sovereignty discourse in international
politics, Russia and Japan have embarked on a complex negotiation process aimed at the signing of a
post-World War Two (WWII) peace treaty and the settling of the longstanding dispute over the
South Kuril Islands. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s sudden proposal to Japanese Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe at the September 2018 Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) in Vladivostok to sign an
unconditional peace treaty, followed by subsequent summits in Singapore, Buenos Aires, and
Moscow, demonstrated the two leaders’ resolves to move closer than ever to a final agreement. Abe
asserts that the issue “will not be left for the next generation” to solve, and observers speculate that a
breakthrough deal might be inked during Putin’s upcoming trip to the G20 summit in Osaka in June
2019.  
 
As this Putin-Abe political dialogue has intensified over recent months, rumors and concerns in both
countries about the real content and subject of negotiations have arisen — so much so that Japanese
Foreign Minister Taro Kono announced on March 18 that the details of these talks will be kept secret
until an appropriate solution is found. The majority of the Japanese public disapproves of any deal
being signed until the four disputed islands are returned. Opinion polls in Russia indicate that only
14% of the population believe that it is worth surrendering a few outposts at sea in order to improve
relations with Japan. Despite the cooperative spirit and official statements of the Putin-Abe
negotiations, the Kremlin has dispatched top officials to visit the Kurils and has continued to
reinforce Russia’s defense installations on the disputed islands. Finally, Moscow has recently set two
major requirements for any peace treaty, both of which make resolution between Russia and Japan
unrealistic. One includes Tokyo’s recognition of Russia’s de-jure sovereignty over the four South
Kuril Islands, which Russia has controlled since WII. The other condition seeks to secure guarantees
by both Tokyo and Washington that the returned islands would be exempt from the 1960 U.S.-Japan
Security Treaty, which grants the United States the right to use some facilities and areas in Japan to
deploy its armed forces on a permanent basis. 
 
There have been many reports in the Russian media that the negotiations have stalled or that the
Kremlin is deceiving Tokyo, using its talks with Japan to drive a wedge between Japan and the
United States. Yet despite such bad press, two considerations suggest that a Russo-Japanese
consensus on the status of the islands does not seem to be out of the question. First, the Kremlin
might consider a potential revision of its Soviet-era “bastion strategy” which required Russia’s  
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absolute control over the Kuril Islands, in exchange for any prospective U.S. troops withdrawal from 
Japan and a multilateral arrangement with all the regional powers (United States included) on 
international access to the Sea of Okhotsk along with Russia’s unfettered access to the Pacific 
Ocean. Second, the Japanese leadership might consider satisfying Russia’s requests to recognize “just- 
in-time” recognition of the “current sovereignty status” of Russia over the islands as a result of WWII. 
Such a move would help Moscow prevent any other attempts to revise the major international and legal 
agreements signed in the aftermath of that war, while reserving Tokyo’s right to put the sovereignty 
issue under negotiations in the future. In his press conference at the East Asian Summit in Singapore in 
November 2018, Putin acknowledged that the 1956 joint declaration “neither mentions a basis for 
returning Habomai and Shikotan nor clarifies which country has sovereignty over the islands,” thus 
making the issue a subject of further negotiations. Potential Japanese concessions might also be fueled 
by growing anti-China sentiment among the Japanese military and political establishment, which is 
seeking to establish a “normal relationship” or even develop strategic cooperation with Russia. Some 
Japanese strategists insist that Japan should immediately agree to Putin’s offer of an unconditional 
peace treaty, form a military partnership with Russia against China, convince the United States to 
refrain from stationing troops on Hokkaido, and establish close economic relations with Moscow. 
 
It is misleading, however, to regard potential Russo-Japanese peace treaty arrangements as targeted 
against China. Beijing would benefit from the reduction of U.S. troops stationed in Japan as a result of a 
potential Moscow-Tokyo deal. Analysts tend to ignore the fact that the Russian president made his 
unconditional peace treaty proposal to Prime Minister Abe in the presence of Chinese president Xi 
Jinping at the forum. In his speech in Vladivostok, the Chinese leader voiced his regional mini-lateral 
and subregional initiatives, which would benefit the six large economies of the Northeast Asian region 
and foster regional integration in the China-Japan-Korea format. It might seem paradoxical, but 
Russia’s plans to improve ties with Japan should be examined in the context of Beijing’s mega-project 
to enhance transregional connectivity in Eurasia. Close collaboration with China within the Belt and 
Road Initiative is instrumental for Russia to increase its strategic significance in both Europe and the 
Indo-Pacific. One should not rule out the possibility that, in coordination with Beijing, Moscow may 
consider making concessions to Tokyo in order to engage Japan and to change the great power 
geometry in the region based on economic integration. New gravitational forces in East Asia may 
instigate Washington’s desire to partake in the regional integration process. This requires U.S. 
involvement in the new China-led production capacity networks in the Indo-Pacific and Eurasia, 
followed by the revision of U.S. regional security arrangements and America’s strategic shift toward 
predominantly soft power means, rather than just military balancing, to secure its long-term presence 
in the region. 
 
For all of these reasons, there might just be some breakthroughs in Osaka this June. To assuage 
potential nationalistic backlash at home, both Japan and Russia need a win-win solution in the form of 
either shared or “deferred” sovereignty. Japan might pass a bill prohibiting the United States from 
building military facilities on the Kunashir and Iturup islands. Prime Minister Abe should apply his art 
of the possible to reconcile the interests of Japan, the United States, China, and Russia on the way 
toward forming a new Indo-Pacific regional order. As a result, America might win support for its future 
regional initiatives from China’s current friend Russia, which would prefer to accommodate itself to 
Asia’s new balance of power by diplomatic and economic rather than military means. 
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